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“It was perhaps naive and overly optimistic to believe that regime change was the 
answer to a problem that has much deeper structural roots.”
The Tangled Politics  
of Postwar Justice in Sri Lanka
JONATHAN GOODHAND AND OLIVER WALTON
When does a “postwar” period begin and when does it end? The victory of the Sri Lankan military over the Tamil mili-
tant group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in May 2009 was widely celebrated in the 
Sinhalese-majority south of the country, where it 
was hailed as the end of a civil war that had lasted 
for more than 25 years. Although the war ended 
with a crushing defeat for the LTTE (and with thou-
sands of civilians killed in the final government 
offensive), in the years that followed the govern-
ment appeared desperate to maintain the sense of 
a country permanently at war, expanding the role 
of the military in many areas of public life and con-
solidating its occupation of the north and east.
For this reason, many felt that the war did not 
properly end until Maithripala Sirisena’s unexpect-
ed defeat of the incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa in 
the January 2015 presidential election, which was 
seen as either the beginning of, or a critical turn-
ing point in, Sri Lanka’s postwar transition. This 
victory for a coalition of Sri Lanka’s two largest 
parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), appeared to open 
up a historic opportunity to bring about a lasting 
and just peace, reversing the drift toward “soft au-
thoritarianism” under Rajapaksa and dismantling 
the victor’s peace that his regime had imposed.
Parliamentary elections in August 2015 con-
firmed the mandate of Sirisena’s new yahapalana-
ya, or “good governance,” coalition—a capacious 
term that had broad-based appeal among both the 
Sinhalese and ethnic minority communities in Sri 
Lanka. Many hoped it signified a new and cleaner 
politics that would root out corruption and nepo-
tism associated with the old regime. Others saw it 
as heralding an ambitious project of democratiza-
tion, state reform, and transitional justice, aimed 
at bringing about a just and inclusive settlement 
to the “national question” of how best to ensure 
minority rights and political representation. And 
there were some who saw yahapalanaya as a nec-
essary antidote to the economic populism and 
growing national debt associated with the previ-
ous government.
Sirisena’s key campaign pledges included abol-
ishing the executive presidency and reforming the 
electoral system. He also promised a reorientation 
of Sri Lanka’s international relations, reengaging 
with Western countries to reduce the heavy reli-
ance on China that had been established under the 
previous government, as well as a renewed com-
mitment to human rights and transitional justice, 
though these issues were not explicitly part of his 
platform. This ambitious reformist agenda—mir-
roring a previous Norwegian-backed experiment 
in liberal peace building in its assumption that “all 
good things come together”—generated high ex-
pectations and initial enthusiasm, both domesti-
cally and in the West.
The National Unity government, capitalizing 
on this widespread support, soon began to follow 
through on its election promises. The nineteenth 
amendment to the constitution was ratified in 
April 2015, restoring key checks and balances on 
the president that had been removed by Rajapaksa. 
Its unanimous passage in Parliament reinforced 
the sense that the new government represented a 
different, more consensual way of doing politics, 
founded on the close cooperation of two main-
stream parties that had been traditional rivals.
The coalition added to its already ambitious 
agenda by campaigning in the August 2015 parlia-
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mentary elections for a new charter of fundamen-
tal rights and the maximum possible devolution of 
power within a unitary state. The replacement of 
pro-Rajapaksa military governors in the north and 
east with civilian officials also raised hopes that 
this would be a first step in the demilitarization of 
the war-affected regions.
In the area of transitional justice, the new gov-
ernment cosponsored an October 2015 United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) reso-
lution promoting reconciliation, human rights, 
and accountability in Sri Lanka. This was seen as 
a significant shift from the previous regime, and 
evidence that the National Unity government had 
taken ownership of transitional justice, while also 
acknowledging that there was a role for interna-
tional actors to play in a hybrid court—as rec-
ommended by a report issued in 2011 by the UN 
Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Account-
ability in Sri Lanka. Rajapaksa, by contrast, had 
strongly resisted any international interference on 
questions of justice and accountability. 
An investigation by the UN 
Office of the High Commission-
er for Human Rights had found 
“horrific levels of violations and 
abuse” in Sri Lanka between 
2002 and 2011. The Rajapaksa 
government’s response to in-
ternational and Tamil diaspora 
pressure had been to create a Lessons Learned and 
Reconciliation Commission, which critics saw as 
designed to play for time and evade questions of 
accountability. Indeed, only 19 of 189 recommen-
dations made by the commission were fully imple-
mented. The official discourse stressed reconcilia-
tion rather than accountability, and development 
rather dwelling on the past, while at the same time 
celebrating and memorializing the sacrifices made 
by patriotic war heroes to defeat the LTTE.
That seemed to change when the new govern-
ment took power. Under the leadership of the new 
foreign minister, Mangala Samaraweera, there ap-
peared to be some momentum behind the push 
for transitional justice. South African officials who 
had been involved with the postapartheid Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission were brought in 
to lend their expertise. The new government de-
veloped a strategy with four key strands: a truth 
commission; reparations; an Office for Missing 
Persons; and most controversially, an independent 
special court for war crimes, with the participation 
of foreign judges.
Steps were taken to put this strategy into ac-
tion on a number of fronts. A Secretariat for Co-
ordination of Conciliation Mechanisms was estab-
lished, and legislation was passed to establish the 
Office for Missing Persons. A Consultation Task 
Force widely canvassed civil society about these 
measures and produced a final report in February 
2017.
Consequently, election promises did yield real 
reforms by the new government in some areas. 
However, over time, it became evident that these 
efforts were meeting strong resistance, both within 
and outside the coalition. Increasingly the “new 
politics” began to look very similar to the old poli-
tics of patronage, horse trading, and compromise. 
This has led to growing public dissatisfaction, 
opening up new space for the old guard and its 
nationalist support base to mobilize.
CONTINUITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
For a government whose legitimacy rested on 
the perception that it represented a clean break 
with the past, and on its prom-
ise to clean up politics by push-
ing through an ambitious re-
form agenda, there was always 
the danger of a large gap be-
tween rhetoric and reality. The 
National Unity government is 
composed of a diverse coalition 
whose main common interest was defeating Raj-
apaksa. While inclusivity was the key to winning 
elections, it did not provide a strong foundation 
for decisive and reform-minded government. Sire-
sena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe 
came from very different political and social back-
grounds. As a result, two distinct centers of power 
quickly emerged within the regime.
The 2015 elections were less transformative 
than they first appeared, and the continuities be-
tween the “old” and the “new” orders have be-
come more apparent over time. The coalition con-
tained many defectors from Rajapaksa’s faction, 
whose loyalties could not be assured. The shadow 
of the old regime, which quickly materialized in 
the form of a Joint Opposition alliance in Parlia-
ment, limits Siresena’s room for maneuver and 
increases the political distance between him and 
the prime minister. Whereas Wickremesinghe is 
comfortable with neoliberal economic policies 
and international calls for transitional justice, 
such policies are anathema to Sirisena’s Sinhalese 
support base.
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Transitional justice has 
become a bargaining chip 
in a high-stakes game.
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The other element of the old elite that has sig-
nificant holding power and can therefore block 
reforms that threaten its interests is the military. 
The political and economic potency of the defense 
establishment was reinforced during the civil war 
and the final years of the Rajapaksa regime. Ex-
amining its role is central to the question of war 
crimes and accountability. That is one of the rea-
sons why the president has resisted the idea of a 
hybrid court, which could potentially involve for-
eign judges convicting as war criminals figures 
seen by many Sri Lankans as war heroes.
The economic legacies of the Rajapaksa period 
have placed further constraints on the new gov-
ernment. While conflict-affected regions have ex-
perienced sustained and rapid economic growth 
since 2009, much of it was driven by infrastructure 
investment that added to the nation’s foreign-debt 
load and forced the government to accept an IMF 
rescue package in 2016. Development at the geo-
graphical margins of the state has been fueled by 
flows of capital from abroad 
or from Colombo, often with 
the close involvement of key 
figures from the previous re-
gime or the military.
These patterns of postwar 
development have created 
new collaborations among 
capital, elites, and ethno-
nationalist ideology. This leads to new forms of 
social conflict by undermining the security of low-
income groups across the country. Questions of 
postwar justice thus have an important economic 
dimension, which sometimes gets missed in inter-
national debates about war crimes and account-
ability.
Sirisena’s electoral victory came overburdened 
with expectations that the new government 
could address the wide range of problems that 
had come to the fore under the previous regime. 
Early optimism about a “Colombo spring” has 
been replaced with a rather more pessimistic out-
look, as the government’s approach to a range of 
issues has grown increasingly hesitant. Some see 
a worrying reemergence of the anti-democratic 
tendencies that grew acute during Rajapaksa’s pe-
riod in office. The government has struck seem-
ingly politically motivated compromises with the 
Rajapaksa camp over corruption and war crimes 
investigations.
There appears to have been a drift from reform-
ism to political normalization, erasing the distinc-
tion between this regime and the previous one. 
Unstable coalition politics are leading to inertia, 
delaying tactics, and dissimulation. These politi-
cal dynamics at the center reverberate in complex 
ways with political demands and mobilization in 
the periphery.
MAXIMAL DEMANDS
In the north, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
leadership faces a series of dilemmas about how to 
engage with the central government, heightened 
by pressures from its own constituency. Should it 
prioritize accountability for war crimes or consti-
tutional reform? At the time of writing, the TNA 
appears to have prioritized the latter, though this 
may change as the government’s commitment to 
revising the constitution wavers.
Tamil leaders have sought to balance national-
ist demands for autonomy and a more pragmatic 
engagement with the government to gain access 
to economic resources and patronage. In both re-
spects they are being chal-
lenged by a resurgent Tamil 
nationalist movement led by 
rival parties such as the Tam-
il National People’s Front, 
diaspora groups, and new 
political formations includ-
ing the Tamil People’s Coun-
cil, which have pressed for a 
more maximalist position that aims to simultane-
ously end continued militarization of the north 
and address war crimes and the need for a federal 
solution to the national question.
The military’s reluctance to return land to civil-
ians continues to be a central issue impinging on 
public trust in the government in the north and 
east. Although the government made a commit-
ment to reviewing high-security zones controlled 
by the military and prioritizing the return of inter-
nally displaced persons by cosponsoring the Oc-
tober 2015 UNHRC resolution, progress has been 
slow. In early 2017, government inaction prompt-
ed outspoken criticism from the TNA leadership 
and a series of sustained public protests both in 
the north and in Colombo.
In the east, the leadership of the Sri Lanka Mus-
lim Congress is being confronted by a more asser-
tive regional identity movement called “the Rise 
of the East.” In the south, anxieties over consti-
tutional reform and transitional justice have been 
heightened by maximalist demands from the Tam-
il population: talk of federalism in the north fuels 
Increasingly the “new politics”  
began to look very similar to  
the old politics of patronage,  
horse trading, and compromise.
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a narrative among Sinhalese nationalists of the ne-
cessity of protecting the unitary state.
Hambantota, an economically marginalized 
district in the deep south, symbolizes wider shifts 
in Sri Lanka’s political relations. Under the Ra-
japaksa government, efforts to establish a new 
development hub in the district signaled both a 
rebalancing of economic and political power away 
from the center and an external strategy of forging 
closer ties with China. However, the current gov-
ernment’s plans to establish a new industrial zone 
were heavily opposed by the Joint Opposition on 
the grounds that the scheme provided a 99-year 
lease to Chinese companies to develop the Ham-
bantota port. Local politicians loyal to Rajapaksa 
were instrumental in mobilizing popular protests 
in December 2016 against the scheme and the 
Sirisena government. The protests reflected long-
standing nationalist concerns about sovereignty 
and neocolonialism, albeit with the Chinese tak-
ing the place of Western colonizers.
These developments offer important clues as to 
the wider direction of the yahapalanaya coalition. 
Although the government is a coalition of two par-
ties representing the Sinhalese majority, the suc-
cess of its postwar package hinges on support from 
minority parties and constituencies at the margins.
VICTORS’ PEACE
Meanwhile, a strong external constituency is 
pressing for the application of international mod-
els of postwar justice and accountability in Sri 
Lanka. But as these processes hit the ground, they 
become entangled in, and interact with, the com-
plex domestic political landscape.
There is an increasingly sophisticated set of le-
gal frameworks, institutions, and practices related 
to transitional justice in postwar contexts. The 
majority of cases deal with wars that ended with 
a negotiated settlement rather than a military vic-
tory. Sri Lanka poses particular challenges given 
the military defeat of the LTTE and the political 
capital gained by the victors. Historically, there are 
very few cases where the victors have voluntarily 
submitted themselves to a transitional justice pro-
cess. In contexts where elites from the old regime 
retain significant power, there has been a tendency 
for “softer” forms of justice that focus on truth-
telling and reconciliation instead of criminal ac-
countability and punishment.
Transitional justice and peace-building process-
es provide opportunities for both the government 
and its critics to speak to and mobilize particular 
audiences, sometimes sending contrasting mes-
sages in different voices to different groups. Some 
of the government’s measures on reconciliation, 
such as allowing the national anthem to be sung 
in Tamil, have sent reassuring signals to interna-
tional observers. But on more contentious issues 
relating to accountability and justice, the govern-
ment has been forced to yield to stronger pressure 
from the military and the Joint Opposition, which 
is quick to mobilize against perceived threats to Sri 
Lankan sovereignty.
Transitional justice involves difficult trade-offs. 
The assumption that all good things come together 
and that state reform, democratization, and tran-
sitional justice are mutually reinforcing ignores 
the complex and messy compromises required to 
make them happen. Morality tales about victims 
and perpetrators, the innocent and guilty, simplify 
the moral ambiguities and political complexities 
of how most societies have sought to build peace 
and come to terms with the past.
Since Sri Lanka gained independence from Brit-
ish rule in 1948, there have been repeated inci-
dents of collective violence and atrocities, but few 
cases where the perpetrators have been brought 
to justice. Time provides a space for societal heal-
ing and compromise. But it also provides tactical 
opportunities for partisan actors. The Sirisena 
government’s faltering progress on transitional 
justice illustrates how strategies of delay can al-
low compromises and tensions to be papered over 
and managed. For example, the government ful-
filled one of its commitments to the UN Human 
Rights Council in August 2016 by rapidly pushing 
through legislation to establish an Office of Miss-
ing Persons. But at the time of writing, the law had 
still not been put into effect.
LIMITED APPETITE
There is a long-standing debate in Sri Lankan 
politics about whether to prioritize political stabil-
ity and economic growth, or instead to emphasize 
the rule of law and political reform. A high level of 
path dependency may be present, with the legacy 
of past failures to reform (during the peace talks 
of 1994 and 2002–3) shaping public expectations 
and limiting political elites’ room for maneuver at 
both the center and the margins. The defeat of Ra-
japaksa and the emergence of a national unity gov-
ernment committed to reform appeared to present 
an opportunity for pushing forward an ambitious 
transitional-justice agenda. Yet in practice the gov-
ernment has been heavily constrained by a set of 
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compromises or tensions that have hampered its 
capacity to implement a coherent agenda.
From the outset, Sirisena had to stave off attacks 
from his own SLFP members of parliament, many 
of whom remain loyal to Rajapaksa. The former 
president has acted as the figurehead for the Joint 
Opposition, and has been vocal in his objections 
to many of the government’s policies. The looming 
threat of an SLFP split has limited the president’s 
appetite for backing bold reforms or challenging 
the military establishment. Furthermore, the pres-
ident and prime minister have different priorities 
regarding state reform and accountability. Siris-
ena has publicly contradicted Wickremesinghe 
at times by denying the need for international in-
volvement in a justice mechanism. These tensions 
are also linked to the differing expectations of do-
mestic and international audiences.
The government has prioritized constitutional 
reform over measures to address postwar justice 
and accountability. But this approach is in tension 
with international mechanisms such as the UNHRC 
and the European Union’s 
preferential tariff scheme, 
the Generalized System of 
Preferences, both of which 
set out specific targets for 
tackling issues relating 
to human rights, justice, 
and accountability. Tran-
sitional justice has become a bargaining chip in a 
high-stakes game: if the Tamil parties do not push 
too hard on war crimes, then the government may 
promise constitutional reforms in return. The pro-
ponents of transitional justice, however, argue that 
it is inseparable from constitutional reforms, since 
there is a need to address the governance struc-
tures that perpetuate injustice in the south as well 
as the north and east.
Despite enthusiastic championing by the for-
eign minister, there is no politically powerful 
group claiming ownership over and advancing 
transitional justice. It did not feature in the presi-
dential or parliamentary elections in 2015 and was 
not part of the government’s electoral mandate. It 
has been largely driven by international concerns, 
though the government did assume leadership on 
the issue when it cosponsored the UNHRC resolu-
tion in October 2015.
The government’s primary concerns are the 
economy, party politics, and constitutional reform. 
To a large extent, it has used transitional justice as 
a means of placating international opinion. Its ef-
forts have been marked by slow progress, missed 
deadlines, and ad hoc initiatives to deflect pres-
sure.
The establishment of a Consultation Task Force 
(CTF), which involved widespread public discus-
sion leading to the release of a report in January 
2017, was a potentially significant step. The report 
emphasized the need for more proactive public 
communication on the government’s transitional 
justice and reform efforts. It supported the par-
ticipation of foreign judges in war crimes courts, 
in line with the October 2015 UNHRC resolution. 
The consultation process was welcomed by inter-
national observers and was seen as a valuable dia-
logue that included affected communities.
However, the CTF has been widely dismissed 
by nationalist critics as an elitist vehicle for 
Colombo-based nongovernmental organizations. 
Nationalist forces both outside and inside the gov-
ernment have used the CTF and other aspects of 
the transitional-justice process to legitimize them-
selves in the eyes of their supporters by playing 
on long-standing fears 
about foreign interference 
and the violation of state 
sovereignty. The president 
himself has dabbled in 
this rhetoric at times, as 
when he stated in March 
2017 that he was not 
“ready to govern the country on NGO opinions.”
In addressing issues of transitional justice, the 
government is bound by a variety of domestic 
and international timetables that often overlap 
and impinge on each other, causing tensions and 
contradictions. On the one hand, it is respond-
ing to domestic political pressures to hold local 
elections and a constitutional referendum, and to 
public opinion in the Sinhalese-majority south, 
which the government regards as largely hostile 
to robust action on transitional justice. On the 
other hand, the government is forced to react to 
the externally imposed timetables of the UNHRC 
and the EU, which call for more concrete and rap-
id progress in certain key areas.
PLAYING FOR TIME
The constraints binding the yahapalaynaya 
government have led to increasingly hesitant 
policy making. This faltering approach can be ob-
served across most policy areas, with setbacks and 
reversals on key decisions regarding the economy 
and anticorruption efforts. But delays have been 
Nationalist forces legitimize  
themselves by playing on long-standing 
fears about foreign interference and 
the violation of state sovereignty.
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most evident with respect to constitutional reform 
and justice. Despite a wide-ranging set of public 
consultations on reform and transitional justice, 
and more than 50 meetings held by a parliamen-
tary steering committee planning a Constitutional 
Assembly, it has not yet produced the draft report 
promised for December 2016. No settled positions 
have emerged on key issues pertaining to devolu-
tion, the electoral system, or abolition of the ex-
ecutive presidency.
The government has failed to communicate ef-
fectively to the public and as a result has ceded 
control of the political agenda to the Joint Opposi-
tion. Declining public confidence in the govern-
ment’s ability to deal decisively with issues relat-
ing to corruption, the economy, and state reform 
is acting as a further barrier to progress. As the 
government’s popularity dwindles, its lack of con-
fidence makes it hold off on calling local elections 
or a constitutional referendum.
At the time of writing, the government’s efforts 
to implement the UNHRC resolution it cosponsored 
are under scrutiny in Geneva. The UNHRC’s latest 
report, issued in March 2017, was highly critical of 
the government, calling its progress “worryingly 
slow” and stating that “the structures set up and 
measures taken until now have been inadequate,” 
lacking “coordination and a sense of urgency.”
Nevertheless, there is a widespread expectation 
that the government will be given more time to act 
on its commitments. Support for an extension has 
come from leading members of the TNA, includ-
ing M.A. Sumanthiran, who has argued that while 
establishing special courts may take time, a new 
constitution can and should be concluded more 
quickly, alongside more concerted efforts to ad-
dress disappearances and demands for the return 
of land. While it seems likely that the government 
will continue the delicate work of balancing the 
contrasting priorities and expectations of interna-
tional and domestic audiences, perhaps the more 
critical challenge it faces is to establish a common 
agenda on state reform and transitional justice, 
and to communicate its goals more effectively to 
the public.
The window of opportunity appears to be rap-
idly closing. It was perhaps naive and overly opti-
mistic to believe that regime change was the an-
swer to a problem that has much deeper structural 
roots. The context is shaped by the legacies of war, 
a reform-resistant state, and a fractured political 
elite. The postwar direction pursued by the Ra-
japaksa regime did not emerge in a vacuum but 
rather drew on preexisting governing practices 
and ideologies, and was sustained through com-
plex entanglements among state actors, elements 
of the business community, and nationalist forces. 
This does not mean that a solution to Sri Lanka’s 
postwar conflicts—or at least a partial one—is im-
possible as a result of the current constellation of 
power. But it will take time, it has to be worked 
out by domestic players, and the justice that 
emerges will most likely depart from international 
standards of best practice. !
